Monday 31 October 2016

Hacker Unlocks High Security Electronic Safes Without a Trace

“High security” consumer electronic safes could certainly be pried open with power tools, but they’re marketed as reasonably robust for daily-life scenarios. On Friday, though, a hacker known as Plore presented strategies for identifying a safe custom-selected keycode and then using it to unlock the safe normally, without any damage or indication that the code has been compromised.

At Defcon, researchers regularly give talks about picking and hacking locks, and there’s even a whole “lock picking village” where people can learn basic skills or share sophisticated techniques. But there are always new locks to investigate and what makes Plore’s techniques interesting is what they lack: any physical or even algorithmic sabotage.

Plore used side-channel attacks to pull it off. These are ways of exploiting physical indicators from a cryptographic system to get around its protections. Here, all Plore had to do was monitor power consumption in the case of one safe, and the amount of time operations took in other, and voila, he was able to figure out the keycodes for locks that are designated by independent third-party testing company Underwriters Laboratory as Type 1 High Security. These aren’t the most robust locks on the market by any means, but they are known to be pretty secure. Safes with these locks are the kind of thing you might have in your house.

In practice, Plore was able to defeat the security of two different safe locks made by Sargent and Greenleaf, each of which uses a six-digit code. “I chose Sargent and Greenleaf locks due to their popularity. They are the lock manufacturer of choice on Liberty brand gun safes, among others, and safes featuring those locks are widely available at major stores,” Plore told WIRED. Plore said he didn’t have time before Defcon to try his attacks on other lock brands, but he added, “I would not be particularly surprised if techniques similar to those I described would apply to other electronic safe locks, other electronic locks in general (e.g., door locks), or other devices that protect secrets (e.g., phones).”

For the Sargent and Greenleaf 6120, a lock developed in the 1990s and still sold today, Plore noticed that when he entered any incorrect keycode he could deduce the correct code by simply monitoring the current being consumed by the lock.

“What you do here is place the resistor in series with the battery and the lock, and by monitoring voltage across that resistor we can learn how much current the lock is drawing at any particular time. And from that we learn something about the state of the lock,” Plore explained. As the lock’s memory checked the input against its stored number sequence, the current on the data line would fluctuate depending on whether the bits storing each number in the code were a 0 or a 1. This essentially spelled out the correct key code until Plore had all of its digits in sequence and could just enter them to unlock the safe. Bafflingly easy.

For the second demonstration, he experimented with a newer lock, the Sargent and Greenleaf Titan PivotBolt. This model has a more secure electronics configuration so Plore couldn’t simply monitor power consumption to discover the correct keycode. He was able to use another side-channel approach, though, a timing attack, to open the lock. Plore observed that as the system checked a user code input against its stored values there was a 28 microsecond delay in current consumption rise when a digit was correct. The more correct digits, the more delayed the rise was. This meant that Plore could efficiently figure out the safe’s keycode by monitoring current over time while trying one through 10 for each digit in the keycode, starting the inputs over with more and more correct digits as he pinpointed them. Plore did have to find a way around the safe’s “penalty lockout feature” that shuts everything down for 10 minutes after five incorrect input attempts, but ultimately he was able to get the whole attack down to 15 minutes, versus the 3.8 years it would take to try every combination and brute force the lock.

“Burglars aren’t going to bother with this. They’re going to use a crowbar or a hydraulic jack from your garage or if they’re really fancy they’ll use a torch,” Plore said. “I think the more interesting thing here is [these attacks] have applicability to other systems. We see other systems that have these sorts of lockout mechanisms.” Plore said that he has been trying to contact Sargent and Greenleaf about the vulnerabilities since February. WIRED reached out to the company for comment but hadn’t heard back by publication time.

Even though no one would expect this type of affordable, consumer-grade lock to be totally infallible, Plore’s researchis important because ithighlights how effective side-channel attacks can be. They allow a bad actor to get in without leaving a trace. And this adds an extra layer of gravity, because not only do these attackscompromise the contents of the safe, they could also go undetected for long periods of time.

Read more: https://www.wired.com/2016/08/hacker-unlocks-high-security-electronic-safes-without-trace/



source http://www.life-safety-equipment.com/hacker-unlocks-high-security-electronic-safes-without-a-trace/

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